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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the 
interfirm relationship in LCD(liquid-crystal display) 
materials industry, focusing on the market and 
organizational principle.2
In the LCD materials industry, many Japanese 
companies are strongly competitive and still lead 
the global market. As will be described later, the 
interfirm relationships between suppliers and 
customers were significant to the strong 
competitiveness of Japanese companies in this 
industry.3  
Many scholars emphasize that Japan’s 
interfirm relationships are illustrated by “obligational 
contractual relationships”, primarily reflecting the 
organizational principle while those of the United 
States and some European countries are represented 
by “arm’s length contractual relationships”, which 
are highly susceptible to market principles.4 
Nevertheless, it goes without saying that not all 
transactions in Japan are based on long-term and 
continual contracts. In other words, interfirm 
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relationships in Japan follow the market principle as 
well as the organizational principle.
Moreover, it seems highly likely that both 
principles are closely intertwined in interfirm 
relationships. There are many existing theoretical 
studies on interfirm relationships such as the 
research by the International Marketing and 
Purchasing (IMP) Group5 which primarily focus on 
the cooperation and interaction between customers 
and suppliers – that is, only on the organizational 
principle in the terms set out by this article. 
However, as this article will show, we should shed 
light on the intertwining between the market and 
the organizational principles in order to develop a 
theory of interfirm relationships.  In fact, in interfirm 
relationship of LCD materials industry, the 
organizational principle and the market principle 
coexist and are interrelated. Hence, I focus on the 
intertwining between the two principles in the LCD 
materials industry in this article.
Furthermore, Japanese LCD materials firms 
conduct frequent transactions with foreign 
customers as Japanese LCD companies were 
overtaken by South Korean and Taiwanese LCD 
companies in the 2000s. Consequently, the 
internationalized management environment in LCD 
materials industry prevented the interfirm 
relationship from turning into something that could 
easily be characterized as “uniquely Japanese”. 
Therefore, this article explores the international 
interfirm relationship between Japanese LCD 
materials companies and foreign LCD companies. 
1 THE SOURCES OF STRONG COMPETITIVENESS 
OF JAPANESE LCD MATERIALS FIRMS
1.1 Strong Competitiveness of Japanese LCD 
Materials Firms
Many materials that share a common 
technology and market characteristics are needed 
to manufacture LCDs. For example, retardation 
film, color filters, alignment layers, ITO film, and 
LCD glass substrates are LCD materials. 
Additionally, backlights, spacers, and materials for 
sealing liquid crystal are also classified as LCD 
materials. Therefore, the LCD materials market is 
segmented. In these market segments, many 
Japanese LCD materials companies are strongly 
competitive, in contrast to the Japanese LCD firms 
that were overtaken by the South Korean and 
Taiwanese LCD companies. In fact, Japanese LCD 
materials firms are at the top of the world market 
and held about 80 percent of the world LCD 
materials market. In particular, Japanese firms 
occupied 100 percent of the market for blue LCD 
glass substrate, anti-glare film, Triacetyl Cellulose 
(TAC) film,6  viewing angle expansion film, spacers, 
seals for LCDs, and pigment dispersion materials for 
color film and resin black matrix.7 
In 2012, Japanese companies held the top two 
positions in most materials markets, such as the 
markets for polarizers, polyvinyl alcohol film (PVA), 
retardation film, and alignment layers for LCDs (see 
Table 1). While Japan was not ranked at the top for 
LCD glass substrates, the Japanese companies 
Asahi Glass, Nippon Electric Glass and Avan Strate 
had about half of the market share.
1.2. Sources of Competitiveness: Technology 
Barriers to Entry 
1.2.1 Oligopoly and barriers to entry
Japanese companies are strong in the LCD 
materials market for many reasons. Specifically, the 
industrial organization in this industry is an 
oligopoly. As shown in Table 1, the number of 
incumbents is small and only two to four companies 
have a dominant position in each market segment. 
In the world market for LCD glass substrates, there 
are five incumbent firms, including the four firms 
mentioned previously and Schott AG, a German 
firm. Hence, these oligopolistic market segments 
primarily consist of Japanese firms. 
The oligopolistic structure of the LCD 
materials industry creates a firm barrier to new 
entry. Equally, the barrier to entry is strengthened 
by this oligopolistic structure. In sum, the 
oligopolistic structure and barrier to entry have a 
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strong influence on each other.
The factors of barriers to entry are classified 
as investment barriers, which are strongly influenced 
by financial factors, and technological barriers. In 
particular, in this industry, technological barriers 
are more important than investment barriers.
The Japanese firms that entered this industry 
early, even though they were not big and had little 
in the way of funds or finance, have been successful. 
If the investment barriers of the industry had been 
high, these companies would most likely have failed 
to enter the market. Currently, there are many 
medium sized companies in this industry. As such, 
we can infer that the investment barriers to entry 
are not high for the LCD materials industry.8  
1.2.2 High-technology barriers to entry
Thus, understanding the technological 
barriers to entry is important for the LCD materials 
industry. Above all, it takes time to accumulate the 
technologies and knowledge to develop and mass-
produce LCD materials. 
For example, as the size of the glass substrates 
for LCDs became larger, it became more critical to 
decrease the amount of deflection and enhance 
strength. It was necessary to lower the ratio of 
shrinkage to swelling caused by heat. In addition, it 
became more important to prevent flaws and 
contamination to increase the yield rate. Ultimately, 
along with the enlargement of glass for LCDs, 
manufacturing became more difficult, thus requiring 
a higher degree of production and product 
technologies, which take time to learn.
Furthermore, the enlargement of LCDs 
required a higher level of optical characteristics of 
PVA and TAC films, the primary materials for LCD 
polarizers. Consequently, it became more difficult 
to process the films and, as a result, quality control 
in manufacturing these films became challenging. To 
be precise, a high degree of technology is needed to 
make the thickness of films even and decrease 
contamination and defects. This can be attained by 
accumulating experience in mass production.
As the size of LCD polarizers increased, the 
specifications for manufacture became stricter. For 
example, manufacturers of LCD polarizers must 
prevent contamination by foreign matter and 
decrease surface irregularity. To meet the amount 
and quality requested by customers, a high level of 
production technology needs to be accumulated on 
the shop floor.9  
Additionally, in manufacturing most of the 
materials for LCD backlights, technologies from 
various sources10  are required, which take time to 
learn. 
This suggests that success in the LCD 
materials industry necessitates a long-term 
perspective from top management. In fact, as many 
LCD material companies are engaged in a variety of 
products, they can bear the risk of investment for 
production and development of a specific product. 
This is a reason why top management of many LCD 
materials companies can maintain a long-term 
perspective. 
Moreover, to accumulate the necessary 
technologies and knowledge, employee experiences 
are significant. Experience in production shops and 
laboratories is particularly important. Ultimately, 
Table 1 Market shares by Japanese companies in LCD materials market segments (2012, %)
Name of product First Second Third
Polarizing plate Nitto Denko (35) Sumitomo Chemical (25) –
Polyvinyl alcohol (PVA) film Kuraray (76) Nippon Gohsei (24) –
Retardation film Konica Minolta (40) Fuji Film (35) JSR (5)
Alignment layer for large size LCD JSR (75–80) Nissan Chemical Industry (15–
20)
–
Alignment layer for small and mid-size 
LCD
Nissan Chemical Industry (about 
90)
JSR (about 10) –
LCD glass substrates Asahi Glass (25) Nippon Electric Glass (20) Avan Strate (4)
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the accumulation of technology at various sites and 
a long-term perspective from management were 
appropriate for several Japanese companies that 
entered this industry.
Other experiences may create technological 
barriers. The cooperation between LCD materials 
companies and their customers can result in the 
competitiveness of Japanese LCD materials 
companies becoming stronger, which will be 
analyzed in detail. 
Furthermore, considering that it takes time to 
accumulate technologies, the experience that LCD 
materials companies gained before entry into the 
market might have contributed to their success. 
For example, Nitto Denko, a top polarizer 
maker, continued to manufacture varnish, a kind of 
electrical insulating material. Thus, the company 
was able to accumulate the technology to synthesize 
polymers and adhesive technology that could then 
be used to produce polarizer film for LCDs. Based 
on the accumulated technology to stress and paste 
together synthetic resins, Okura Industrial also 
entered the market for retardation film and polarizer 
film for LCDs.
In producing PVA, the technology required to 
form a thin layer with uniform characteristics is very 
important and the level of technology that 
customers, which are the LCD polarizer makers, 
require is high. Kuraray, the leading company of 
this market segment and a former textile company, 
accumulated the technology by integrating 
production from resin to film before entering the 
LCD polarizer market.
Asahi Glass accumulated core technologies 
through experience in manufacturing glass for 
construction and automobiles. In starting an LCD 
glass substrate business, the company used core 
technologies, such as the processing and design 
technology of glass materials, fluorine processing 
technology, and the technology for forming thin 
layers with surface treatment. ZEON and JSR used 
the technology for molecular control from experience 
in the synthetic rubber business to manufacture and 
develop retardation film and color register.
Further, Fujifilm developed TAC film for LCD 
polarizers using the technology of the base film for 
photos, which it had accumulated while in the photo 
business. The company used coating technology to 
form a thin layer with uniform characteristics, and 
organic synthetic technology, film deposition 
technology, and optical simulation technology to 
produce TAC film for LCD polarizers. Konica 
Minolta also used photo film technology to create 
TAC film for LCD polarizers. For example, the 
company used the technology to dry the metal plate 
that liquefies the resin film with a solvent, and then 
peeled the film to create a new product. This 
technology was accumulated with experience in 
photographic film production. Finally, Stanley 
Electronic Co. used the technology accumulated in 
the automotive lighting products business to 
manufacture the cold-cathode tubes for LCD 
backlights.
Indeed, some Japanese companies accumulated 
technologies and knowledge over time. Therefore, 
they were able to overcome the technological 
barrier to enter the LCD materials market and 
maintain their dominant positions in each market 
segment.
Additionally, there are other sources of 
competitiveness of Japanese LCD materials 
companies. For example, before the market segment 
was saturated completely, Japanese material 
companies attempted to find new emerging market 
segments and shift management resources using 
their accumulated technology. Furthermore, they 
changed market segments repeatedly if a new 
profitable market segment emerged.11  This shows 
that Japanese materials companies have the 
capability to understand the change of future 
markets and the flexibility to shift between market 
segments. This flexibility is incorporated in the 
transaction behavior of the companies and includes 
both the market principle and the organizational 
principle. Therefore, I will examine the interfirm 
relationship of LCD materials companies, focusing 
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on the interaction between the market principle and 
the organizational principle.
2 COEXISTENCE OF THE MARKET PRINCIPLE AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLE: COOPERATION 
WITH AND COST REDUCTION PRESSURE BY 
CUSTOMERS
2.1 Cooperation between Japanese Customers and 
Suppliers: The Organizational Principle
Japanese LCD materials companies and LCD 
companies have cooperated in various ways. First, 
they cooperated occasionally through the co-
development of the customized materials needed for 
manufacturing LCDs. 
In 1995, Fujifilm and its customer Sharp co-
developed a new production method for optical film 
for LCDs: they developed the method to manufacture 
color photosensitive transfer film that was pasted to 
LCD glass substrates. With this new method, the 
film production process was much simpler and, as a 
result, it reduced production cost. In fact, Fujifilm 
introduced the method for mass production of the 
film in the spring of 1996. A very wide range of 
technology, such as film processing technology, 
optical analysis technology and coating technology 
is needed to develop the polarizing plates for large 
LCDs because it is essential to adjust the optical 
characteristics according to the structure of the 
LCD. As a result, the polarizing plate firms and 
LCD firms frequently co-developed materials and 
exchanged technological information.12 
Sharp co-developed with suppliers to develop 
backlights, color filters and polarizing plates, 
working together from the early designing phases.13 
There are even cases of customers supplying 
material companies with technology related to the 
manufacturing of LCD materials. For example, in 
1995 Seiko Epson actively supplied the suppliers of 
backlights, polarizing and color filters with 
technology related to cost reduction in 
manufacturing.
Moreover, firms cooperated in other ways. 
Some Japanese LCD companies encouraged LCD 
materials firms to establish their factories nearby. 
When Sharp established a new LCD factory in 
Kameyama City in the Mie Prefecture in 2002, it 
encouraged LCD materials firms to establish their 
factories in the vicinity of the Kameyama factory. 
Some LCD materials companies moved near the site 
of Sharp’s LCD factory before it built the new LCD 
factory in Kameyama, and others moved after the 
new factory was constructed.14  This cooperation 
illustrates the organizational principle in the 
transactions between Japanese LCD companies and 
LCD materials companies. The LCD firm customers 
probably expected the cooperation to reduce 
transportation costs and improve productivity. 
Moreover, they probably expected that it would be 
easier to exchange market information and 
technological information with suppliers. It is also 
highly probable that the cooperation had several 
positive effects on the LCD materials suppliers.15 
First, the cooperation with big customers resulted 
in stable orders for LCD materials even though the 
demand for LCD materials fluctuated. In addition, 
because the targets for development and production 
became clearer, the pace of material development 
and investment increased. Second, by keeping 
cooperative relations with specific big customers, 
LCD materials companies gained their trust and 
sales increased. Furthermore, this trust developed 
their reputation and they were able to expand sales 
to other customers.16  
Third, the exchange of information between 
LCD materials companies and LCD companies 
increased, including technological information. As a 
result, LCD materials companies were able to 
accumulate technologies for high valued-added 
products and state-of-the-art production, as will 
be noted later, thereby increasing the sales of 
materials.
2.2 The Pressure to Reduce Costs from Customers 
and the Multi-source Policy: The Market Principle 
While customers and suppliers of LCD 
materials cooperated closely, the materials 
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customers also put strong pressure on the LCD 
materials suppliers to reduce costs.
Along with the increase in LCD demand after 
the late 1990s, many companies entered the 
emerging LCD market from other industries. Thus, 
the competition among LCD companies regarding 
cost reduction and high quality became more 
intense. Specifically, competition for prices and 
product differentiation was intensified. As previously 
described, the cost of the material to manufacture 
LCDs was very high so reducing materials costs 
became more important to stay competitive. 
Eventually, LCD companies urged LCD materials 
manufacturers to reduce the cost of production.
Such strong pressure to reduce costs created 
a conflict of interest and strained the relations 
between customers and suppliers. This tension and 
conflict became apparent in the bargaining process 
of LCD materials transactions. This indicates the 
market principle. Hence, the cooperation shows the 
organizational principle and the conflict of interest 
demonstrates the market principle in the interfirm 
relationships of LCD materials transactions. 
Moreover, interfirm relationships are not 
exclusive. LCD firms have a multi-source policy, 
purchasing the same materials from many suppliers. 
In other words, LCD firms made efforts to keep 
multiple materials companies as suppliers to create 
competition among suppliers. 17 For example, in the 
mid-1990s, LCD firms used many suppliers to 
disperse the risk of purchasing LCD glass substrates 
and color filters. Sharp’s Kameyama Factory bought 
large-size LCD glass substrates from Corning as 
well as from Asahi Glass. In addition, Sharp produced 
color filters in-house and also bought them from Dai 
Nippon Printing (DNP) and Toppan. Consequently, 
DNP and Toppan competed fiercely to develop new 
production methods. In the sense that customers 
make use of the competition among the suppliers of 
LCD materials, a multi-source policy suggests the 
market principle.
3 THE INTERTWINING ACTION BETWEEN THE 
MARKET AND ORGANIZATIONAL PRINCIPLE IN 
THE INTERFIRM RELATIONSHIPS AMONG 
JAPANESE COMPANIES
3.1 Technology Accumulation by Cooperation: The 
Organizational Principle
By repeated information exchange with big 
customers, LCD materials companies can 
accumulate technologies. According to Numagami’s 
study,18  co-development between Japanese LCD 
companies and LCD materials companies greatly 
contributed to advancing the technology and 
thereby establishing the technical capabilities of the 
Japanese materials companies. For example, in the 
early 1980s, Toppan practiced co-development 
with engineers of the central laboratory of 
Matsushita Electric Industrial to develop the color 
filter for video cameras. Ultimately, this co-
development largely contributed to Toppan’s 
success in the LCD color filter business.
Additionally, in the Japanese LCD materials 
industry, transactions of materials take the form of 
a chain(see figure 1). For example, while color filter 
firms were suppliers of LCD glass substrate, ITO 
film makers and LCD firms purchased registers as 
raw materials from Tokyo Ohka Kogyo, Toyo Ink, 
JSR, Intek, Hitachi Chemical and Fujifilm Hunt 
Chemicals. Then, register companies purchased 
dispersed pigments and sold registers to other LCD 
materials companies. Polarizing plates firms 
purchase PVA film and TAC film, but are also 
suppliers to LCD companies. Reflective polarization 
film makers purchase polyester and polyethylene 
terephthalate and sell reflective polarization films to 
backlight makers.
This chain of transactions in Japanese LCD 
materials contributes to the accumulation of 
technology.19  In particular, any technological 
progress and improvement stimulates and 
accelerates the change in related technologies in 
the chain of transactions. For example, as the LCD 
size increased, the original form of the acrylic resin 
in the manufacturing diffuser plates for LCD 
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backlights warped due to the moisture. Therefore, 
the firms that manufacture the diffuser plates for 
LCD backlights had to change the resin to 
polystyrene.20  This implies that the technological 
progress in the industry had various sources and 
progressed rapidly and widely. Similarly, investment 
by an LCD materials company stimulated other 
LCD materials companies through the chain of 
transactions. For instance, Kurarey and Nippon 
Gohsei, strong Japanese PVA film firms, actively 
sought capital investment in 2007 because their 
customer, Nitto Denko, invested in the expansion of 
production capacity. The chain of investment 
accelerated the increase in production and the 
progress of technology.
Furthermore, many LCD materials companies 
are simultaneously both customers and suppliers in 
the chain of transactions. Thus, LCD materials 
companies share the common interests of both 
suppliers and customers. Consequently, it seems 
likely that suppliers and customers of LCD materials 
would cooperate more easily and accelerate 
technology accumulation. This demonstrates the 
organizational principle.
The technology accumulation through the 
chain of transactions cooperating with customers is 
an important factor that increases the technology 
barriers to entry in this industry. Thus, this is an 
important source of strength for Japanese LCD 
materials companies. This demonstrates the 
organizational principle in interfirm relationships. 
Furthermore, it shows that the organizational 
principle may function positively for both parties in 
the transaction of LCD materials. 
3.2 The Change in Bargaining Power in the 
Transaction of Materials: The Market Principle
On the other hand, the cooperation of 
suppliers and customers disadvantaged customers, 
although this was unexpected. In other words, 
cooperation between suppliers and customers 
weakened one party in the transactions for LCD 
materials. Specifically, the cooperation influenced 
the change in bargaining power in LCD materials 
transactions. Even with the cooperation, the 
interests of LCD firms and LCD materials firms 
Figure 1 The chain of transaction between LCD materials
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conflicted with each other, especially when 
negotiating for LCD materials. This illustrates that 
the cooperation between LCD firms and LCD 
materials companies, which shows the organizational 
principle, resulted in a negative effect on the 
customers in the bargaining process of transactions, 
which represents the market principle. 
Take a closer look at the paradoxical 
phenomena. Since LCD materials manufacturers 
accumulated technology and knowledge through 
transactions with big customers, the technology 
barriers to entry in the LCD materials industry 
became higher, thereby strengthening the 
oligopolistic character of the industry. In general, in 
an oligopolistic market the behaviors of rival 
companies are clearly apparent. Accordingly, the 
companies can adjust the total supply of the industry 
more easily than in a competitive market. 
Furthermore, LCD firms had to depend on 
oligopolistic materials firms because it became very 
difficult to find other materials companies to 
purchase the same materials as a second source. 
Consequently, the bargaining power of Japanese 
LCD materials firms increased in the negotiations of 
LCD materials with big customers. 
Indeed, in the initial phase of the LCD 
materials industry, the bargaining power of new 
materials firms was very weak in transactions with 
LCD firms because most LCD firms had big 
customers. LCD firms considered materials firms 
only as small subcontractors. For example, when 
Shinto Paint21  entered the market for color film for 
LCDs in the mid-1990s, Toshiba, one of the big 
customers of LCD materials, outsourced only part 
of the color filter production process to Shinto 
Paint.22  
However, primarily due to the accumulation of 
technological capability resulting from the 
cooperation with LCD firms, LCD materials 
companies strengthened their bargaining power in 
transactions of LCD materials. Although there is 
little direct evidence, indirect evidence can be 
acquired by comparing the price change of LCD 
materials with the prices of LCDs in the same 
period. In short, in a period of sluggish demand for 
LCDs, the LCD materials prices declined more 
slowly than LCD prices.
Specifically, LCD prices declined in the fall of 
2004, although the price was stable after the 
recovery from the “IT recession” in 2002. Compared 
with the first half of 2004, the prices of LCDs for 
TVs in April 2005 decreased by about 50 percent. 
Even though LCD prices became stable in the 
spring of 2005, they fell sharply in 2006. The price 
of an LCD for a 32-inch and a 37-inch TV declined 
about 25 percent during the first half of 2006, and 
the price of an LCD for a 17-inch and a 19-inch PC 
fell about 30 percent during the same period. Due to 
the sharp drop in LCD prices, LCD firms suffered a 
drop in profits. Consequently, they urged the LCD 
materials firms to reduce the price of their products. 
However, the drop in LCD materials prices 
was slower than for LCDs, although the prices of 
some LCD materials fell considerably. For instance, 
the price of LCD glass substrates declined about 10 
percent during the first half of 2006. The price of 
Cold Cathode Fluorescent Tubes (CCFLs), which 
are used to manufacture LCD backlights, decreased 
slightly in the same period. Conversely, the price of 
PVA film, a material for manufacturing polarizing 
plates, increased.23  
These examples show that LCD materials 
have a strong bargaining power in the transactions 
of each material. In comparison, LCD materials 
firms were considered to be small subcontractors in 
the initial phase of the LCD industry, and their 
bargaining power in the transactions of materials 
increased substantially. 
However, this does not mean that they should 
not cooperate. Therefore, cooperation and conflict 
co-exist and are interrelated. In other words, the 
organizational principle and the market principle 
co-exist and are interrelated.24 
4 THE INTERTWINING ACTION BETWEEN THE 
MARKET PRINCIPLE AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
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PRINCIPLE BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES
Japanese LCD materials firms have frequently 
transacted with many foreign customers since the 
early 2000s. As a result, the transactions of the 
materials are significantly internationalized even 
though the nationalities of customers are limited to 
Far East Asian countries, such as Korea, Taiwan 
and Japan.25  Thus, the organizational principle and 
the market principle exist and are internationally 
intertwined in the transactions of LCD materials.
4.1 The Market Principle
The behavior of customers and suppliers, 
which illustrates the market principle, can be 
observed in the international transaction of LCD 
materials. Initially, Korean and Taiwanese LCD 
companies purchased the same materials from 
multiple suppliers. That is, they practice a multi-
source policy similar to Japanese LCD firms such as 
Sharp. As a result, each materials company in the 
same market segment attempts to sell to the same 
customer simultaneously and competes fiercely to 
sell to foreign customers with whom they continue 
to have a good relationship. These phenomena 
illustrate the market principle.
For example, LG Display, a Korean LCD firm 
and strong rival of Japanese LCD makers, continued 
to purchase LCD glass substrates from Asahi Glass 
and Nippon Electric Glass simultaneously. A Taiwan 
LCD manufacturer purchased color filters from 
Sumitomo Chemical and Toppan. Moreover, Korean 
and Taiwan LCD firms that practice in-house 
production of color filters and polarizing plates also 
purchase them from Japanese materials firms. These 
examples are illustrations that LCD firms continue 
to make use of the competition among LCD materials 
suppliers, demonstrating the market principle.
Second, each Japanese LCD materials 
company established at least three different 
production bases, including multiple overseas 
production lines, to prevent them committing to a 
specific foreign customers too much. For instance, 
Nitto Denko and JSR established production lines in 
Taiwan, Korea and Japan.26  Sumitomo Chemical 
dispatched engineers to overseas production bases 
in Taiwan and Korea. Additionally, the company 
practiced co-development with Taiwanese and 
Korean LCD makers to learn new technology related 
to the next generation of LCD panels. Asahi Glass 
has a production line near the LCD factories of 
Samsung Electronics and LG Display in Korea, as 
well as near the LCD factories of Taiwan LCD firms 
in Central Taiwan and Sharp’s factory in Japan. 
Nippon Electric Glass has a LCD glass substrate 
production line in the LCD agglomeration districts 
of Samsung Electronics and LG Display in Korea as 
well as in Central Taiwan. These behaviors disperse 
the risk of depending on a specific customer by 
creating competition among suppliers. 
In conclusion, customers and suppliers used 
competition of the other party of transaction each 
other.  This demonstrates the market principle. 
Third, LCD companies can change suppliers 
of materials if they create problems. For example, 
Chimei Electronic in Taiwan had purchased LCD 
glass substrates almost exclusively from Asahi Glass 
and suddenly changed their supplier to the Taiwan 
Factory of Corning, signing a long-term transaction 
contract in August 2004. This was largely because 
Asahi Glass failed to meet the delivery deadline for 
LCD glass substrates for production of the sixth 
generation LCD panel because of a quality problem 
in the production of glass products.27  Although 
Japanese LCD materials firms can continue relations 
with specific customers, they are at the same time 
exposed to the threat of being replaced. This also 
illustrates the market principle.
Finally, since LCD companies in East Asian 
countries compete fiercely with each other, they are 
under pressure to deliver high-quality and low-cost 
materials. This also indicates possible conflicts of 
interest between Japanese LCD materials firms and 
foreign LCD firms. The pressure and conflict 
between customers and suppliers of LCD materials 
are evidence of the market principle.
There are other cases that show the conflict 
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between the suppliers and customers of LCD 
materials. For instance, when Japanese LCD 
materials companies established a production line 
near the factories of foreign LCD companies, most 
of the production lines concentrated on the post-
processes.28  Asahi Glass and Nippon Electric Glass 
Nitto Denko, JSR and Sumitomo Chemical have only 
post-processes in overseas factories.
With regard to the manufacturing of LCD 
materials, post-processes are less important than 
pre-processes, even though the former are also 
important in terms of cost. This is due to materials 
firms fearing that information about the core 
technology of their materials products and 
manufacturing might be leaked to foreign customers. 
This indicates a conflict of interest between 
Japanese materials companies and foreign LCD 
companies. 
4.2.The Organizational Principle29 
There are behaviors in the international 
transaction of LCD materials that demonstrate the 
organizational principle.
Above all, many Japanese LCD materials 
companies have production lines in LCD 
agglomeration districts in South Korea and Taiwan 
in accordance with their customers’ requests. In 
Korea, where the world’s top LCD makers Samsung 
Electronics and LG Display are located, Japanese 
firms of LCD glass substrate, color filters, polarizing 
plates and CCFL for backlights have production 
lines in the agglomeration district of LCD 
production.30  For instance, Samsung Electronics 
invited Sumitomo Chemical to their LCD factory in 
Pyeongtaek to manufacture color filters and 
polarizing plates. In addition, Asahi Kasei Chemicals 
also has a production line of LCD diffusers and 
light-guiding plates for LCD backlights in this 
factory.
Since the early 2000s, Asahi Glass has had 
polishing process lines of LCD glass substrate in LG 
Display’s LCD factory in Kumi City. Nippon 
Electric Glass also founded an LCD glass substrate 
manufacturing company as a joint venture with LG 
Display in 2005. The company built a post-process 
line of LCD glass substrate in LG Display’s LCD 
factory in Paju City and began production of LCD 
glass substrate for the seventh generation LCD in 
February 2006. 
Moreover, Japanese LCD materials companies 
built factories in 2000 when the Taiwanese LCD 
industry started in earnest, although they did not 
intend to supply specific LCD firms. Along with the 
construction of the industrial district in Central and 
Southern Taiwan in the late 1990s, many Japanese 
LCD materials firms established production lines.
In Southern Taiwan, several Taiwanese LCD 
makers moved to the “Science Park” that was 
established by the regional government and the 
Chimei Business Group in 1999.31  Soon after, some 
Japanese materials companies, such as Toppan and 
DNP, also established a manufacturing base for 
color filters in the park as a joint venture. 
Furthermore, they carried out technology transfers 
to Taiwan and production outsourcing to the local 
materials companies. Sumitomo Chemical began 
manufacturing LCD polarizing plates in the park in 
a joint venture with SC-IK Technology, a local 
polarizing plate maker. Chisso established a 
production base for LCD materials in the park as 
well.
There are also science and industrial parks 
and Japanese LCD materials manufacturing facilities 
in Central Taiwan. For example, Nitto Denko, which 
had a manufacturing base in Central Taiwan, started 
producing LCD polarizing plates in the science park 
in 2005. Asahi Glass started producing LCD glass 
substrates in Central Taiwan’s industrial park in 
August 2000, and Nippon Electric Glass had 
production facilities of LCD glass substrates in the 
region. JSR founded the JSR Micro Taiwan as a 
subsidiary company in Taiwan and began the mass 
production of color register in 2006.
Furthermore, Taiwanese LCD manufacturers 
and Japanese LCD materials companies cooperated. 
Some Taiwanese LCD firms invested in the Japanese 
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materials firms. For instance, AU Optoelectronics 
(AUO), a first-rate Taiwanese LCD firm, invested 
money in the Taiwanese subsidiary company of 
Toppan that specialized in manufacturing color 
filters by buying 37.9 percent of the issued stock. 
The investment by AUO strengthened the 
cooperative interfirm relationship between AUO 
and Toppan, especially in terms of technology. 
Cooperation like this strengthened the 
competitiveness of materials companies. Indeed, 
based on the cooperation with Samsung Electronics, 
Sumitomo Chemical increased its sales of acrylic 
plates for LCDs. Furthermore, since high quality 
products in each materials market segment are 
supplied only by a few Japanese LCD materials 
companies, they supported the foreign LCD 
companies. These examples of cooperation between 
Japanese LCD materials firms and foreign LCD 
companies demonstrate the organizational principle 
beyond national boundaries and that it interacts 
with the market principle.
CONCLUSION
In the interfirm relationship between Japanese 
LCD materials companies and LCD companies, the 
organizational principle works. First, they 
cooperated occasionally through the co-
development of the customized materials needed for 
manufacturing LCDs. Second, some Japanese LCD 
companies encouraged LCD materials firms to 
establish their factories nearby. Third, the exchange 
of information between LCD materials companies 
and LCD companies increased, including 
technological information. 
By the cooperation, LCD materials companies 
were able to accumulate technologies for high 
valued-added products and state-of-the-art 
production. As a result, barrier to entry in this 
industry become higher and the oligopolistic 
structure gets harder. Eventually Japanese LCD 
materials companies became stronger in the market. 
In addition, before the market segment was 
saturated completely, Japanese material companies 
successfully attempt to find new emerging market 
segments and shift management resources using 
their accumulated technology. This flexibility, which 
implies both the market principle and the 
organizational principle, is also other source of 
strong competitiveness of Japanese LCD materials 
companies.
On the other hand, the market principle works 
as well in the interfirm relationship in this industry. 
For example, the cost of the material to manufacture 
LCDs is very high so reducing materials costs 
became more important to stay competitive. 
Eventually, LCD companies urge LCD materials 
manufacturers to reduce the cost of production. 
Such strong pressure to reduce costs creates a 
conflict of interest and strains the relations between 
customers and suppliers. In particular, the tension 
and conflict become apparent in the bargaining 
process of LCD materials transactions. This 
pressure and conflict demonstrate the market 
principle. Moreover, LCD firms made efforts to 
keep multiple materials companies as suppliers to 
create competition among suppliers, which implies 
the market principle.
Again, the market and the organizational 
principles are intertwined. Specifically, the 
cooperation between LCD firms and LCD materials 
firms which represent the organizational principle 
weakened one party of the transaction for LCD 
materials, which represents the market principle. 
For instance, since LCD materials manufacturers 
accumulate technology and knowledge through 
transactions with big customers, the bargaining 
power of Japanese LCD materials firms increased in 
the negotiation of LCD materials with big customers. 
In sum, due to the accumulation of technological 
capability through the cooperation between 
suppliers and customers of LCD materials, the 
suppliers, LCD materials companies strengthened 
their bargaining power in transactions of them and 
created the potential conflicts of interest.
At the same time, as Japanese LCD materials 
firms have frequently transacted with many foreign 
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customers since the early 2000s, the transactions of 
the materials are significantly internationalized. It 
illustrates that the organizational principle and the 
market principle in the transaction of LCD materials 
internationally work and are intertwined.
In new industries such as this LCD materials 
industry, interfirm relationships were globalized in 
the early phase of the industry. As a result, The 
behaviors of individual companies that cannot be 
expressed in terms of their “Japanese-ness” will 
become more important as transactions increase 
among companies of different nationalities. The 
specific characteristics of interfirm relationships in 
each country will be less important in the future, 
especially within the context of globalization. 
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